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• Not Proposed Paper: Potential Gains from Wider Use of Real Call 
Options to Meet Uncertain Demand for Support Assets
• Problem: Motivating Case Study (MARAD) < Exemplary
• Possible Solution: Fixing MARAD may offer guidance on “How to” 
make effective, efficient use of Call Options
• Result: More on MARAD, Less on General Case
Q: Exemplary Use of Real Call Options to Meet DoD 
Demand for Emergency Ocean Shipping Services? 
Answer: No. May be least-cost means of meeting volatile demand  
but budget treatment/financing obscures, rather than disclosing, 
cost. 
Maritime Security Program (MSP)’s cost an enduring mystery!
Current Policy: Inconsistent with good budgetary and acquisition 
policy.  Possible ways forward? (Spoiler alert: legislation likely 
required)
Source of interest and proposal
Federal Budget specialist (not defense) but aware of budget agencies’ 
antipathy… .
NAPA Study: Social cost-benefit analysis and more efficient alignment 
of budget resources (Title XI loan guarantees for shipbuilding in US)
Quid Pro Quo for restoring funding request for MARAD to Trump 2018 
budget proposal
NB: Jones Act (domestic shipping; US shipyards ) beyond scope of 
study; Sen. McCain’s and many others’ issue
MARAD’s Shifting Mission
• “…to foster, promote, and develop the merchant maritime industry of US” 
(1950 Act), i.e. advocate for, provide subsidies. Commerce focus
• Assure shipping capacity (US-owned, flagged, crewed vessels) to meet DoD 
Emergency Sealift needs (1996 Act). National Defense emphasis
• Ready Reserve Force, 46 ships. Owned by gov., managed by private contractors (e.g. 
Maersk), partial crew, berthed, loaded. Budget cost $8 million per year per ship, 
excluding capital cost (a government financial management tradition).
• Maritime Security Program, 60 ships. Privately owned and operated in international 
trade, MARAD cost $5 million “retainer” per ship per year. Fair-value exchange: cash 
for call option?
• Sounds like an innovative use of real call options
Is it? What’s up w/MSP?
• Research method: deduction from a few clues.
• Maybe more Chief Inspector Jacques Clouseau than Sherlock Holmes
• Not much useful information disclosed
• Old 
• Key Operating cost data for US- and foreign-flags from 2010
• Last MARAD stand alone Annual Report 2013  (2012 data)
• Not relevant
• No estimate of total subsidies paid to US flag ships 
• Most recent reported total preference cargo payments (2012)
• Perhaps not entirely MARAD’s fault: DoD, DoT, Political/legislative constraints
A Few Contextual Numbers
• Currently 81 US-flagged, privately-owned vessels involved in international trade, 
• 60 in MSP
• 21 not in MSP: niche carriers (dry bulk, DoD charters), all eligible for “preference cargo” (US 
government “impelled” cargoes, owned or financed). Foreign-flags not eligible
• Number of US-flags declining steadily since WWII, >1000; US share of international shipping < 
2%
• US owned, crewed
• Most owned by “documentary citizens:” corporate subsidiaries of foreign shippers,  e.g. 
Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd. (container, geared container, roll-on/roll-off)
• Thousands of foreign-flag ships in international trade
• Over 500 US owned foreign-flag ships: US crews not required
Registered in Marshall Islands, Singapore, Liberia
Key to Solving MSP Cost Q: US-flag ships not 
competitive in international shipping market
• Estimated average operating cost 2.7 x higher than foreign flag ships.  Crew cost 5 x higher. 
MARAD’s last published estimate for 2010.
• Extrapolating 2010 data, average across US-flag vessels, US-flag ship operating costs about $8 
million per year higher than an equivalent foreign flag ship. (Explains US share of international 
market < 2%)
• To continue operating, US flag ships need $8 million more in annual revenue than foreign flags
• MSP ships receive $5 million “retainer;” $3 million min. preference cargo “premium” (excess 
over market rates) Note: Preference cargo premium shows up in budget of shippers, not 
MARAD
• Non-MSP must get all $8 million from preference cargo premium
• Total gap = 81 X $8 = $648 – $300 = minimum of $348 million from preference cargo premium
How Big is Actual Cargo Preference Premium?
• MARAD: significant but unknown.
• Minimum value: to cover operating cost gap after MSP payment
• $348 million/total revenue from preference cargo ($3.7 billion), all US Flags (last MARAD report FY2012)
• Minimum = 8 - 10% premium
• Factors keeping it near the minimum
• Potential entrants
• DoD Monopsony (90 % of preference cargo)
• Factors pushing rate up: DoD charter rates about 60%  higher; 9 new US flags 2017
• Concentrated ownership/labor supply: many opportunities for consultation
• Cost of entry
• Commercial First 
• Uncertainty and risk
Average Annual Subsidy to Commercial US-
Flag Ships (crude estimates)
Minimum: $8 million = about the same as RRF, excluding 
capital costs
Actual: $8 million plus ? (unknown)
Decisions made without knowledge of price (cost). 
• Salient measure for MSP is $5 million, which is understatement.  
• Non-MSP US flags appear to be costless
Alternatives to Current Policy
Additional potential 
service providers
• > 500 US Owned, foreign-flag 
(“seizure” possible in 
emergency)
• 120 Military Sealift Command 
(Civ-Mar) But “commercial 
first”
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Drop cargo preference; 
replace with single 




Auction slots in MSP.
• Open bidding to US owned 
foreign flags 
• Make cost of commercial 
reserve transparent
• Maybe less costly
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Implications for Acquisition Policy (I)
In MSP, government is attempting to increase the number of US-flag 
ships beyond the number the market will support (apparently zero).
At minimum, US opportunity cost is the lost value from diverting US 
labor and capital from higher valued uses to commercial maritime. In 
worse case, it is significantly higher.
A cost cannot be avoided by obscuring its total value; but making cost 
transparent can permit it to be managed more effectively. Better 
budgetary accounting serves the objectives of good acquisition policy.
Implications for Acquisition Policy (II) 
• Potential for Gains from Use of Real Call Options Remains Appealing
• DoD Initiative
• Analysis of Value
• Defense requirements
• Commercial First (two goals, one instrument)
• US Crew Alternatives, e.g. autonomous, attended vessels; trans-shipment
• Cash Transaction
• Competitive, Qualified Bids
• Alternatives to US Crews
• Option Length
• Getting Policy-Maker Buy-in! (For further study….)
